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Abstract: 
Knowledge has been the most important engine of economy, and it can advance the enterprise’s 
competitiveness, but the roles of tacit knowledge and explicit are different in enterprise’s 
operation of supply chain. The mutual conversion of tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge in 
supply chain forms the spiral rising process of value creation. Tacit knowledge is the core 
factor. Considering the circumstance of knowledge content is negative linear correlation to 
costs in a two-echelon supply chain which is consists of multi manufacturers and multi retailers 
in multi periods, the paper studies on the decision conditions of nodal enterprise’ tacit 
knowledge conversion, and gain the discount rate of their making tacit knowledge conversion 
decision in multi periods. At last a numerical example is put forward to explain the decision 
conditions. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
With the development of market economy, the traditional mode of achieving economy growth 
that depends on the resources such as production, labor and other resources has been changed. 
Knowledge has been the most important engine of economy, and then formed the so-called 
knowledge economy. Knowledge has been often mentioned by people, but what is knowledge? 
It is difficult for many people to define it. On the other hand, supply chain has been paid more 
attention to by people, as it is consists of many nodal enterprises, such as manufactures, sellers, 
multi modal transporters. There are lots of knowledge management actions among them. In 
order to know the role of knowledge in supply chain, we need to understand what the 
knowledge is. 
Knowledge of the nodal enterprise in supply chain is divided into exogenous knowledge 
(professional) and endogenous knowledge (occurring from practice). The exogenous 
knowledge refers to the purpose of organized scientific research, technological inventions, 
technology development and other activities created and accumulated by accepting the 
disseminated knowledge from other organizations or by knowledge spillovers. From the 
perspective of exogenous knowledge, we can see that the enterprise can acquire knowledge by 
learning from other organizations’ introduction of technology. At this time, knowledge 
accepted from others is usually the effect of knowledge spillovers from the external knowledge 
networks. On the other hand, the extensive cooperation and technical union among enterprises 
can create and accumulate knowledge. The knowledge alliances among enterprises is a form of 
organization’s knowledge innovation. Endogenous knowledge refers to the rational experience 
accumulated in the process of practice and the transaction, and continuous accumulation of 
knowledge through such processes. Seen from endogenous knowledge, we know that 
knowledge occurs from practice, that is so-called "Truth comes from practice”, which is from 
the practice of knowledge sharing and trading among enterprises. 
From the perspective of knowledge generation, we can gain knowledge from the 
communication among enterprises in supply chain, which has a higher degree of transparency. 
The general knowledge has been normative and standard, and which can be displayed by the 
means of physical form or data attached to the entity. Thus the uncertainty of the expected 
value is usually relatively small. While the opacity of knowledge acquired from the member 
enterprises is strong, or to be translucent. A lot of knowledge has not been full normative and 
standard, mainly in the form of making knowledge tacit. Although the uncertainty of the 
translucent knowledge’s value is not strong, but once it does good to enterprises to create 
competitive advantage, the sustainability of this competitive advantage is often likely longer 
than the outsourcing of knowledge. There are characters such as causal ambiguity of 
knowledge for the outer competitors of enterprise. As for the opaque knowledge can only be 
identified within the smaller range in enterprise. Once it is converted into the source of 
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competitive advantage, its persistence will be stronger. The main purpose of knowledge sharing 
is to dig out the translucent knowledge and opaque knowledge to make knowledge innovation 
and form a sustainable competitive advantage for enterprises. 
But how does the knowledge innovation occur and how does the process form? In fact 
knowledge can be divided into tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge. They play different 
roles in enterprise of supply chain. As the conversion process of them will advance the 
competitiveness. But people and enterprise in supply chain won’t convert their tacit knowledge 
and explicit knowledge. The paper studied on the knowledge conversion conditions of nodal 
enterprise in supply chain with game theory models. And the author gave some models and 
conclusions about the knowledge conversion process.  
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Connotation of knowledge 
In China, two explanations are given in Ciyuan Dictionary. First, met to see and know people; 
second, people'sunderstanding of things. Knowledge is defined as the results and crystallization 
of human knowledge in Cihai Dictionary, and it pointed out that human’s knowledge is the 
reflection of reality and it is acquired in the social practice. The definition of knowledge in 
Modern Chinese Dictionary is that the sum of knowledge and experience in the practice of 
changing the world. We can see that knowledge include with human knowledge, understanding 
of the results of practice and experience. 
In foreign countries, knowledge management has been paid more attention to by people, About 
the concept of knowledge, Nonaka (1994) considered that knowledge is a recognized faith 
belief, is created, organized and delivered by the knowledge holder and is the recipient’s belief 
mode and constraints. At the same time it delivers the total cultural system and the related 
background system. Hedlund, (1994) believes that knowledge is the cognitive knowledge in 
people's minds and ideas, technology, and knowledge embedded in products, services or other 
carrier. The cognitive knowledge is the main experience of the surrounding environment, its 
existing form is a personal experience, which is the first hand knowledge to respond to 
environment and necessary to complete the work. The technology is the normative, embedded 
and disciplinary knowledge which is refined on the basis of cognitive knowledge. Davenport, 
ect. (1998) considered that knowledge is the mixture of experience, important value, 
contextualized information and insight which provides a framework for evaluation and 
integration of new experiences. Leonard, et al. (1998) considered that knowledge is the relevant 
and actionable information that is based upon experience and which is a subset of information, 
It is a concealed ingredients that is subjective, conscious act. O, Dell (1998) pointed out that 
knowledge is information put into action. Knowledge is the organizational staff’s understanding 
about customers, products, procedures, past mistakes, successful experience, regardless of 
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whether it is tacit or explicit. Zack (1999) pointed out that the information become knowledge 
after understanding its rules. Seviby (1999) pointed out that knowledge has multifaceted 
significance, it can be referred as news, perception, knowing, cognition, intelligence, 
identification, science, experience, skills, insight, competence, know-how, learning and 
confirmation, etc. Its definition should be considered by the application of the content. And he 
pointed out that there are four characteristics about knowledge: ① Knowledge is tacit. ② 
Knowledge is action-oriented. ③Knowledge is supported by the law (practice).④ Knowledge 
is changed. And he put forward that competence represent the definition of knowledge. Long & 
Fahey (2000) pointed out that knowledge is a product of people's thinking and spirit, it is a kind 
of resources rooted in a particular individual or a collective, or embedded in a process, it is 
contextualized, knowledge is embedded in language, stories, concepts, rules and tools. Alavi 
(2001) divided the definition of knowledge into five categories such as state of mind, target, a 
process, information usage as well as capacity over the years, experts and scholars view’s 
knowledge, then the definition of knowledge is different. Bhagat, Kedia, Harveston & Triandis 
(2002) considered that knowledge is gained from the unrelated information’s changes, 
reconstruction and creation. Which is broader, deeper and richer than information or data is. 
Peter Drucker considered that knowledge is the information which can change some people or 
subject, which is different with general information, it include with the mode that cause the 
information to be a action, and the information used to make the individual or organization to 
have the ability to change behavior more effective.  
So knowledge can be attributed to as a capacity carrier, which is a driving force to enhance the 
ability of corporate value. It has the characteristics such as awareness, dissemination, update 
and value creation. Knowledge is the flow combination of structured experience, the values 
associated with information and expert insight. Knowledge is rooted in the daily work, 
procedures, practices and norms of enterprise. For specific business activities of enterprises, the 
knowledge provides the solution on the basis of the information analysis for a particular user's 
needs and problems, it involved with more tacit knowledge, in addition to the need for explicit 
knowledge. In practice, we have a number of different ways to add to the data’s value such as 
association, classification, computation, correction, compression, etc. and make it to convert to 
information. Wide range of applications of computer technology today, you can make use of 
computer to classify, calculate data, but the computer cannot be deeply associated, corrected 
and activities inducted, which must make use of human’s help. Similarly, we can convert the 
information to be knowledge by the modes of comparison, inference, contact, dialogue. In the 
knowledge management, in fact, the scheme that put the data, information, knowledge as a 
whole, rather than clear hierarchical division is the most practical, those are the principles 
adopted in this article. 
2.2 Tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge 
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The enterprise’s knowledge is divided into tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge, and tacit 
knowledge plays a dominant role. Tacit knowledge refers to the knowledge that cannot be 
clearly expressed, which existing in the minds of people, and can only be expressed by action. 
Tacit knowledge is defined as a highly personalized and difficult formatted knowledge such as 
the understanding of director, intuition and premonition by Nonaka and Takeuchi. The original 
concept explained by polanyi in the book of personal knowledge published in1958. OECD 
clearly give the classification of explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge, in which the factual 
knowledge and principle knowledge can be expressed in the knowledge that we are generally 
talking about explicit knowledge; Skills knowledge and human knowledge is difficult to be 
expressed in words, that is tacit knowledge. Explicit knowledge is relatively easy to deal with, 
is tangible, and can be identified, you can express and transfer by language, text, digital, 
transmission. Thus it can be relatively easily integrated into the organizational strategy by the 
use of information and communication technologies, while tacit knowledge is more difficult to 
deal with. Tacit knowledge comes from the individual judgments and perceptions of the outer 
world, such as judgment, and perception which has a strong individuality, it is difficult to be 
clearly expressed by language, and it is difficult to be identified, often remain in the minds of 
individuals in the form of personal knowledge, which is the basis of individual skills. The 
management of explicit knowledge is to codify, database, while the management of tacit 
knowledge is to make it to be explicit. Of course, not all of the explicit knowledge should be 
encoded, and not all tacit knowledge should be explicit one. According to Nonaka and 
Takeuchi’s definition, tacit knowledge referred to the knowledge that is highly personalized 
and difficult formatted such as the director’s understanding, intuition and premonition. The 
explicit knowledge such as the edited procedures or universal principles which can be 
expressed by text and numbers, easily exchanged and shared in the form of hard data. In general, 
tacit knowledge is better than explicit knowledge, and can create more value, the mining and 
utilization of tacit knowledge will be the key to gain success for the individuals and 
organizations. The tacit knowledge is divided into four categories: difficult constraint skills, 
knowledge of know how, mental models (including with ways of thinking and value, etc.), 
problem-solving and organizational practices. Experience, skills and mental mode are the 
important wealth of enterprise, is the specific form of tacit knowledge, is the most core 
capabilities of the enterprise, and as this knowledge is often tacit, not coded, and therefore it 
cannot easily be to be imitated. We can make the valuable tacit knowledge convert to be 
explicit knowledge by the use of secret codes, metaphors, analogies and models. On the other 
hand, the explicit knowledge should be able to quickly convert to tacit knowledge, otherwise 
the true value is no existing. Because the process of employees’ explicit knowledge conversion 
to be tacit knowledge are generally the process of knowledge application or knowledge to 
become productive process.  
2.3 Knowledge conversion 
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As the tacit knowledge is tacit, not encoded, making it difficult to be imitated and stolen. The 
process of making tacit knowledge to be explicit can widen its scope, which achieves greater 
value of knowledge in practice, from this perspective, tacit knowledge conversion process is the 
process of value creation. The mutual conversion’s process of explicit knowledge and tacit 
knowledge is the knowledge interaction and the quality and quantity are both advanced. The 
SECI model is proposed by Nonaka and which consists of four components: socialization 
(conversion of tacit knowledge to tacit knowledge), externalization (conversion of tacit 
knowledge to explicit knowledge), combination (conversion of explicit knowledge to explicit 
knowledge), internalization (conversion of explicit knowledge to tacit knowledge). The 
knowledge creation of supply chain and enterprise realize in the mutual conversion’s process of 
explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge. In Nonaka's spiral rising model of knowledge creation, 
knowledge moves from the bottom to upper in the organization, from the individual level to the 
team level of knowledge, and finally into the knowledge of the organization. With the spiral 
rising of knowledge in the organization, the total spiral rising knowledge is enhanced and 
enlarged by the interaction between individuals and their interactions in the organization. 
Where the organization can be seen as a enterprise, or can also be seen as a supply chain. 
Although completion of the entire organization knowledge creation needs the dynamic action 
among the four knowledge conversion modes, only when the coordination and form a 
continuous spiral rising knowledge that the process of knowledge creation can be completed by 
the organization, thereinto the tacit knowledge is the core factor of the total knowledge 
creation. 
3. HYPOTHESES AND MODELS 
3.1 Hypotheses 
There are two levels about the supply chain considered in this article, which is consists of 
manufacturers and retailers and includes with m  manufacturers, are expressed by 
Mj ( mj ,,2,1  ). Mj  
represents the profit of manufacturer Mj , W  represents product 
sales price, MjC  represents unit production cost, MjX  represents the quantity of tacit 
knowledge, MjX  represents the quantity of making tacit knowledge to be  explicit 
(0≤ MjX ≤ MjX ,if MjX ＝0, then means that manufacturer Mj  doesn't make its tacit 
knowledge to be explicit, if MjX ＝ MjX , then means that manufacturer Mj  will totally 
make its tacit knowledge to be explicit.). The sales quantity of manufacturer Mj  is jq . Sum 
of all manufacturers' sales is represented by MQ , and assuming the manufacturers can meet the 
needs of retailers. There are n  retailers expressed by Ri（ i =1,2,…, n ）and Ri  represents 
its profit. The market price of the product is 



n
k
kqbaP
1
,  
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in which kq  represents the sales quantity of retailer k. a ＞0, b＞0. RiC  represents unit 
operation cost, RiX  represents quantity of tacit knowledge and RiX  represents quantity of 
its explicit knowledge (0≤ RiX ≤ RiX ,if MjX ＝0, then means that retailer Ri  doesn't make 
its tacit knowledge to be explicit, if MjX ＝ MjX , then means that retailer Ri  will totally 
make its tacit knowledge to be explicit.) . The sales quantity of retailer Ri  is iq . Sum of all 
retailers' sales is represented by RQ . Assuming a product of one manufacturer corresponds to 
the product of one retailer, so the equation MQ ＝ RQ  could be set up. For ease of modeling, 
two special hypotheses are set up here: 
Hypothesis 1: There are a negative linear correlation between the knowledge content and the 
cost. 
Hypothesis 2: There are object of making the tacit knowledge to be explicit, and only the object 
can accept it. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.1 The conversion and delivering process of tacit knowledge and explicit knowledge in a two-echelon 
supply chain 
3.2 The game models for tacit knowledge conversion of nodal enterprise in 
supply chain 
(1) The game models for tacit knowledge conversion of nodal enterprise in single period 
The supply chain is composed of m manufacturers and n  retailers in a single period. There 
is Cournot competition between the manufacturers, so are the retailers, and there is Stackelberg 
game between retailers and manufacturers. The game process is as follows: 
Step one: Each manufacturer and retailer determines whether to make their tacit knowledge to 
be explicit, manufacturers and retailers decide whether to obtain that knowledge which have 
been explicit. 
Manufacture1 
Manufacture2 
Manufacture3 
Retailer 1 
Retailer 2 
Retailer 3 
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Step two: Each manufacturer and retailer could observe the explicit knowledge. 
Step three: According to the available knowledge, the manufacturers start Cournot competition 
and form the equilibrium price to the retailers. 
Step four: Based on the equilibrium price, each retailer decides sales quantity. 
Step five: Manufacturers meet the retailers’ order quantity.  
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Then utilize formula (2) to obtain the derivation for any retailer Ri 's sales quantity ( iq ) by 
using 0
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
i
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q
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 and get the formula (3): 
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∵ MQ ＝ RQ  ∴ We could get the formula (4) by taking formula (3) into formula (1): 
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Then utilize formula (4) to obtain the derivation for any manufacturer Mj 's sales quantity ( jq ) 
by using 
j
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Take the formula (5) into 
j
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＝0 and get formula (6): 
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Take the equation MQ ＝ RQ  and formula(5) into formula(3) and get the formula (7): 
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Take the equation MQ ＝ RQ  and formula (7) into formula (3) and get formula (8): 
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Take the formula (5) and (6) into the formula (4) and get formula (9): 
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Take the formula (5), (7 ) and (8) into the formula (2) and get formula (10): 
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(2) The game models for tacit knowledge conversion of nodal enterprise in multi periods 
Considering decisions in multiple periods, manufacturers and retailers can also firstly make the 
decision that not to make their tacit knowledge to be explicit, but on the basis of their 
respective interests to decide its knowledge management activities. As the enterprise 
management and operation of supply chain are continuous, the nodal enterprises in supply 
chain will inevitably suffer revenge in subsequent periods because they don't cooperate with 
each other at the beginning. In this way, it will form multi periods game model. In such cases, 
the relationship between enterprises will become complex. For ease of modeling, here we 
assume that manufacturer Mj  and retailer Ri  are two specific nodal enterprises. (Note: when 
we get that specific game result, we could analyze any manufacturer and retailer by promoting j 
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and i.), and assuming that they don't make their tacit knowledge to be explicit. The game is 
divided into two periods, as follows: 
First period: Manufacturer Mj
 
and retailer Ri  don't make their tacit knowledge to be explicit, 
and other retailers and manufacturers could not expect it and continue to make their tacit 
knowledge to be explicit. 
Second period: Other manufacturers and retailers decide to punish manufacturer Mj
 
and 
retailer Ri  after observing their action in the first period. During the follow-up cooperation, 
other manufacturers and retailers make their knowledge tacit to manufacturer Mj
 
and 
retailer Ri  and make their tacit knowledge to be explicit to others, until manufacturer Mj  and 
retailer Ri  make their tacit knowledge to be explicit. 
First period: There are five steps about the game process as above and takes inverse method in 
solving the question. 
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Note: j and i are specific numbers which represent the serial number of manufacturer and 
retailer that don't make their tacit knowledge to be explicit in the first period, but   and   
are not specific numbers which represent the serial number of other manufacturers and retailers 
that make their tacit knowledge to be explicit in the first period. 
1≤ ≤ m , and ≠ j ; 1≤  ≤ n , and  ≠ i . 
We can also get the formula (15) and (16) by taking inverse method: 
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Second period: Other manufacturers and retailers take punitive action. In this case, the game 
model is shown as formula (17), (18), (19) and (20): 
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Note: j , i ,  and   have the same meaning and value as the first period. 
It can also get the formula (21) and (22) by taking inverse method: 
Mj = 
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Ri = 
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3.3 The decision condition when nodal enterprise doesn’t deviate from the 
conversion of tacit knowledge firstly 
Assuming the discount rate is   in multi periods’ decision, the profit comparison under two 
situations that whether the specific manufacturer and the specific retailer make their tacit 
knowledge to be explicit are shown as follows. 
By the formula (5), (15) and (21), we can know, in multi periods, for the specific manufacturer 
Mj , the condition that there is no departure from the externalization of the tacit knowledge 
management activities is:  
formula (9) 

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1
1
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1
. 
The result by calculating as formula (23): 
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By the formula (10), (16) and (22), we can know, in multi periods, for the specific retailer Ri , 
the condition that there is no departure from the externalization of the tacit knowledge 
management activities is:  
formula (10) 


1
1
>formula(16) +formula(22) 




1
. 
The result by calculating as formula (24): 
 < 
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(24) 
( 
Conclusion: In complex supply chain which is consists of multiple manufacturers and retailers, 
the specific manufacturer who doesn’t deviate from making the tacit knowledge to be explicit 
in single period, needs to meet the condition (23), and specific retailer needs to meet the 
condition (24).  
4. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE 
4.1 Data collection and sample 
In order to visually illustrate the models, assuming a two level supply chain which is consists of 
six manufacturers and eight retailers, and each nodal enterprise data is shown in Tab. 1. 
Tab. 1 Data of Each Nodal Enterprise in Supply Chain 
The article analyzes the specific situation that is consists of manufacturer Mj and retailer Ri , so 
the discount rate of their making tacit knowledge conversion decision are effected by the two 
decision subjects. 
4.2 Analysis 
Nodal 
enterprise 
Manufacturer Mj  Retailer Ri  
Serial number 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Cost  105 96 113 108 92 90 107 106 85 112 110 99 87 108 
Original 
knowledge 
content 
18 13 11 17 18 12 8 9 7 8 9 9 7 12 
Explicit 
knowledge 
content 
5 7 4 5 3 4 3 2 4 6 7 5 2 5 
Total number MQ =1000 RQ =1000 
Other 
parameters 
—— a ＝60, b ＝0.03 
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(1) Analysis of manufacturer 
When we analyze the manufacturer, as the discount rate is affected by the quantity of its 
making tacit knowledge to be explicit, but also by the retailer‘s quantity of making tacit 
knowledge to be explicit, in order to calculate the discount rate threshold of the manufacturer, 
we must first determine the combination of the retailers who doesn’t making their tacit 
knowledge to be explicit. The results by calculation are shown in Tab.2. When the discount rate 
in practice is greater than the corresponding discount rate threshold, manufacturers will not 
make their tacit knowledge to be explicit, but make them tacit. Note that, as the discount rate is 
greater than or equal to zero in practice, in some combinations the discount rate is negative, 
which indicates that manufacturers will make their tacit knowledge to be tacit under the 
combination. 
 
Tab. 2 The Discount Rate Threshold of Manufacturer j' s Tacit Knowledge Decision 
      
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 
R1 0.0016 -0.0087 0.0183 0.0101 -0.0454 -0.0295 
R2 0.0016 -0.0085 0.0179 0.0099 -0.0439 -0.0286 
R3 0.0016 -0.0090 0.0188 0.0104 -0.0469 -0.0304 
R4 0.0017 -0.0095 0.0196 0.0109 -0.0504 -0.0323 
R5 0.0018 -0.0098 0.0201 0.0112 -0.0522 -0.0334 
R6 0.0017 -0.0092 0.0192 0.0106 -0.0486 -0.0313 
R7 0.0016 -0.0085 0.0179 0.0099 -0.0439 -0.0286 
R8 0.0017 -0.0092 0.0192 0.0106 -0.0486 -0.0313 
Note: When the discount rate is negative, it indicates that manufacturer will make its tacit knowledge 
to be tacit. 
(2) Analysis of retailer 
When we analyze the retailer, as the discount rate is affected by the quantity of its making tacit 
knowledge to be explicit, but also by the manufacturer ‘s quantity of making tacit knowledge to 
be explicit, in order to calculate the discount rate threshold of the retailer, in order to calculate 
the discount rate threshold of the retailer, we must first determine the combination of the 
manufacturers who make their tacit knowledge to be explicit in different extent, The results by 
calculation are shown in Tab.3. When the discount rate in practice is greater than the 
Retailer  
 Discount  
   rate  
Manufacturer 
Volume 7, No. 2 
112 
 
corresponding discount rate threshold, retailers will not make their tacit knowledge to be 
explicit, but make them tacit. Note that, as the discount rate is greater than or equal to zero in 
practice, in some combinations the discount rate is negative, which indicates that retailers must 
make their tacit knowledge under the combination. 
Tab. 3 The Discount Rate Threshold of Retailer i's Tacit Knowledge Decision 
      
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 R8 
M1 
 1 
0.0060 0.0014 -0.1363 0.0303 0.0313 -0.0147 -0.0474 0.0067 
M2 
 2 
0.0064 0.0015 -0.1538 0.0320 0.0332 -0.0158 -0.0523 0.0072 
M3 
r 3 
0.0058 0.0013 -0.1287 0.0294 0.0304 -0.0143 -0.0452 0.0065 
M4 
 4 
0.0060 0.0014 -0.1363 0.0303 0.0313 -0.0147 -0.0474 0.0067 
M 5 
 5 
0.0057 0.0013 -0.1217 0.0286 0.0295 -0.0138 -0.0431 0.0063 
M6 
 6 
0.0058 0.0013 -0.1287 0.0294 0.0304 -0.0143 -0.0452 0.0065 
Note: When the discount rate is negative, it indicates that retailer will must make its tacit knowledge 
to be tacit.  
5. CONCLUSION 
Considering their own interests to make tacit knowledge to be explicit is frequently used in 
making decisions in many enterprises. It's easy to make the decision in single period, but the 
business is under the situation of multi periods, the behavior of deviation from group in single 
period will lead to other nodal enterprises to take punitive measures to give tit for that. This 
article takes a two level supply chain, which is composed of multiple manufacturers and 
retailers as an example, analyzes the tacit knowledge management decision of specific 
manufacturer Mj  and retailer Ri , and gets the critical condition when specific 
manufacturer Mj  and retailer Ri  could deviate from making tacit knowledge to be explicit. It 
could be seen that the analysis of this article is under the circumstance that there are only one 
manufacturer and one retailer who make the tacit knowledge management decision, but how 
the final result will be if it is extended to any quantity of manufacturers and retailers. This will 
be the further topic of research. 
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